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THE GREAT DISRUPTION:  HOW MACHINE 
INTELLIGENCE WILL TRANSFORM THE ROLE 
OF LAWYERS IN THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL 
SERVICES 
John O. McGinnis* & Russell G. Pearce** 
INTRODUCTION 
Law is an information technology—a code that regulates social life.  In 
our age, the machinery of information technology is growing exponentially 
in power, not only in hardware, but also in the software capacity of the 
programs that run on computers.  As a result, the legal profession faces a 
great disruption.  Information technology has already had a huge impact on 
traditional journalism, causing revenues to fall by about a third and 
employment to decrease by about 17,000 people in the last eight years1 and 
very substantially decreasing the market value of newspapers.  Because law 
consists of more specialized and personalized information, the disruption is 
beginning in law after journalism.  But, its effects will be as wide ranging.  
Indeed they may ultimately be greater, because legal information is 
generally of higher value, being central to the protection of individuals’ 
lives and property. 
The disruption has already begun.  In discovery, for instance, 
computationally based services are already replacing the task of document 
review that lawyers have performed in the past.  But computational services 
are on the cusp of substituting for other legal tasks—from the generation of 
legal documents to predicting outcomes in litigation.  And when machine 
intelligence becomes as good as lawyers in developing some service or 
some factor of production that contributes to a service, it does not stop 
improving.  Intelligent machines will become better and better, both in 
terms of performance and cost.  And unlike humans, they can work 
ceaselessly around the clock, without sleep or caffeine.  Such continuous 
technological acceleration in computational power is the difference between 
previous technological improvements in legal services and those driven by 
machine intelligence.  This difference makes it the single most important 
 
*  George C. Dixon Professor in Constitutional Law, Northwestern University School of 
Law. 
**  Edward & Marilyn Bellet Professor of Legal Ethics, Morality, and Religion, Fordham 
University School of Law. 
 1. See Jesse Holcomb, News Revenue Declines Despite Growth from New Sources, 
PEW RES. CENTER (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/03/news-
revenue-declines-despite-growth-from-new-sources/. 
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phenomenon with which the legal profession will need to grapple in the 
coming decades. 
These developments have enormous implications for every aspect of 
law—legal practice, jurisprudence, and legal education.  Here, we focus on 
one important consequence:  the weakening of lawyers’ market power over 
providing legal services.  We argue that these developments will generally 
increase competition.  They will commoditize legal services, permitting 
clients to make easier price comparisons.  They will also bring in new 
entrants, both as direct suppliers of services and low-cost providers of 
inputs to services of lawyers. 
These new technologies will substantially shake up the legal profession, 
harming the economic prospects of many lawyers, but providing advantages 
to some others.  Machines may actually aid two kinds of lawyers in 
particular.  First, superstars in the profession will be more identifiable and 
will use technology to extend their reach.  Second, lawyers who can change 
their practice or organization to take advantage of lower cost inputs made 
available by machines will be able to serve an expanding market of legal 
services for middle-class individuals and small businesses, meeting 
previously unfulfilled legal needs. 
Machines may, at least at first, neither greatly help nor substantially harm 
other classes of lawyers and some of their functions.  First, because 
machines will not speak in court for the foreseeable future, oral advocates 
will continue to enjoy a lucrative niche, although machines may reduce the 
number of disputes by creating a convergence of litigants on the value of a 
case.  Second, those lawyers who are in highly specialized areas subject to 
rapid legal change, like Dodd-Frank regulation, will be relatively 
unaffected, because machines will work best in more routinized and settled 
areas.  Third, counselors who must persuade unwilling clients to do what is 
in their self-interest will also continue to have a role, since machines will be 
unable to create the necessary emotional bonds with clients. 
But journeymen lawyers—such as those who write routine wills, vet 
house closings, write standard contracts, and review documents—face a 
much bleaker future, because machines will do many such routine legal 
tasks.  Thus, while the arrival of the machines will be generally good for 
consumers, the picture is much more mixed for lawyers. 
The surest way for lawyers to retain the market power of old is to use bar 
regulation to delay and obstruct the use of machine intelligence.  But bar 
regulation will generally be unavailing.  First, lawyers will be able to use 
many machine-created products to make their own work more cost 
effective.  Thus, using machine inputs can comply with bar regulation, 
while also creating competitive pressures by lowering costs and reducing 
the need for the aid of other lawyers.  Second, even if unauthorized practice 
laws in the United States do not change to permit extensive machine 
intelligence in the production of legal services, those laws will continue to 
prove ineffective in stemming the emergence of widespread machine 
lawyering and preserving lawyers’ monopoly.  Moreover, the global nature 
of machine intelligence will continue to put pressure on the U.S. market for 
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legal services, regardless of the laws of the United States.  The message 
here is that the machines are coming, and bar regulation will not keep them 
out of the profession or do much to delay their arrival. 
This Article proceeds in two Parts.  Part I describes the relentless growth 
of computer power in hardware, software, and data collection capacity.  
This Part emphasizes that machine intelligence is not a one-time event that 
lawyers will have to accommodate.  Instead, it is an accelerating force that 
will invade an ever-larger territory and exercise a more firm dominion over 
this larger area.  We then describe five areas in which machine intelligence 
will provide services or factors of production currently provided by 
lawyers:  discovery, legal search, document generation, brief generation, 
and prediction of case outcomes.  Part II discusses how these developments 
may create unprecedented competitive pressures in many areas of 
lawyering.  This Part further shows that bar regulation will be unable to 
stop such competition.  Because bar regulation will be ineffective, we 
expect an age of unparalleled innovation in legal services, as startups 
compete to deliver important components of legal tasks in new ways. 
I.  THE MANY AVATARS OF MACHINE INTELLIGENCE IN LAW 
In this Part, we first consider the general rise of machine intelligence.  
Second, we consider how this rise may affect five areas of legal practice.  
Third, we suggest that, over time, these transformations will change legal 
practice, helping superstars at the expense of journeymen lawyers.  Fourth, 
we respond to some possible objections to the proposition that machine 
intelligence will make a fundamental difference to the legal profession. 
A.  The Rise and Rise of Machine Intelligence 
Computers have been accelerating in power according to “Moore’s Law.”  
This law reflects the regularity that the number of transistors that can be 
fitted onto a computer chip doubles every eighteen months2 to two years.3  
For over forty years, computers have been growing at a similarly 
exponential rate.4  Computers are to the late twentieth century and early 
twenty-first century what the steam machine was to the nineteenth—the 
primary dynamo and symbol of progress.5 
Recently, researchers confirmed that Moore’s Law remains accurate and 
further noted that a similar exponential growth occurs in the 
telecommunication and storage of information.6  In a 2011 article, two 
 
 2. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1620 n.147 (2003). 
 3. See Moore’s Law, INTEL CORP., http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/silicon-
innovations/moores-law-technology.html?wapkw=moores+law (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 4. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1620 n.147. 
 5. See HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 379–90 (Henry Cabot Lodge 
ed., 1918) (discussing the Virgin as the symbol of the Middle Ages and the steam engine as 
that of the nineteenth century). 
 6. See Martin Hilbert & Priscila López, The World’s Technological Capacity To Store, 
Communicate, and Compute Information, SCIENCE, Apr. 1, 2011, at 60, 64. 
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researchers calculated that the computing capacity of information, which 
they define as the communication of information through space and time 
guided by an algorithm, is growing by approximately 58 percent a year—
very close to the eighteen-month doubling posited by Moore’s law.7  The 
temporal communication aspect of information, such as broadband capacity, 
has been growing at 28 percent per year, doubling in approximately thirty-
four months.8  The spatial capacity for storage has been growing at 23 
percent per year with a doubling time of about forty months.9  The latter 
capacities provide the infrastructure for the growth of “big data”—the 
increasingly accurate representation of our world in digital form. 
We generally think in linear terms.  But when we understand its power, 
exponential growth should command our attention.  The computational 
power in a cell phone today is a thousand times greater and a million times 
less expensive than all the computing power housed at MIT in 1965.10  
Assuming that computers continue to double in power, their hardware 
dimension alone will be over two hundred times more powerful in 2030.11 
To be sure, the question remains of how long Moore’s Law will continue.  
Intel, the largest chipmaker, has projected that Moore’s Law will extend 
until at least 2029.12  In any event, substantial evidence suggests that 
computing has been growing at an exponential rate since before the rise of 
the chips that power our machines today.13  Other methods are under study, 
such as optical computing or quantum computing, which can provide 
continued rapid growth.14 
Looking at the exponential increase in hardware capability actually 
understates the change in computational capacity in two ways.  A study 
considering improvements in a computer task used a benchmark for 
measuring computer speed over a fifteen-year period.15  It suggested that 
the speed of performing the task had been improved by 1,000 times through 
increases in hardware capacity.  But improvements in software algorithms 
also increased computer speed to an even greater extent.16 
Computers interconnect among themselves and with human intelligence.  
The most salient and obvious mechanism is the internet.  But this 
 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Ray Kurzweil, Making the World a Billion Times Better, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 
2008, at B4. 
 11. See HANS MORAVEC, ROBOT:  MERE MACHINE TO TRANSCENDENT MIND 7 (1999). 
 12. Jeremy Geelan, Moore’s Law:  “We See No End in Sight,” Says Intel’s Pat 
Gelsinger, SYS-CON MEDIA (May 1, 2008), http://java.sys-con.com/read/557154.htm. 
 13. Id. 
 14. For a helpful introduction to quantum computing, see GEORGE JOHNSON, A 
SHORTCUT THROUGH TIME:  THE PATH TO THE QUANTUM COMPUTER (2003). 
 15. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT:  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & 
TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS:  DESIGNING A DIGITAL FUTURE:  
FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN NETWORKING AND INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 71 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
microsites/ostp/pcast-nitrd-report-2010.pdf. 
 16. Id. 
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interconnection is a process, not a single event.  The internet will not only 
connect more and more people, but also more and more physical objects 
though RFID tags—the so-called “internet of things.”17  The internet will 
also become more sensate as more sensors are attached to it, connecting it 
to the environment as well as the objects of the world around us. 
The greater power of computation, as represented in hardware, software, 
and connectivity, was behind the creation of Watson, the IBM machine that 
beat the best Jeopardy champions of all time in 2011.18  Jeopardy is a game 
of complexity and breadth, requiring players to disentangle elements that 
seem unique to human understanding, including jokes, rhymes, and 
language games.  This combination of natural language capability, together 
with the capacity to analyze issues containing different kinds of information 
and ambiguity, make Watson’s application relevant to the discussion of 
machines in the practice of law.  Watson won by exploiting the 
improvements in all three areas discussed above—hardware, software, and 
connectivity—all capacities that can be expected to rapidly improve.  As a 
result, Watson is a harbinger of the growing scope of machine intelligence 
in daily life. 
Indeed, IBM considers Watson so important that it has created a division 
around the machine, investing $1 billion in the machine’s development.19  
IBM is using its program to aid in medical diagnosis.20  At a recent 
competition on how to make use of Watson, the winning entry centered on 
the legal field, using Watson to search for relevant evidence in data and 
predict how helpful the evidence will be to winning the case.21  This kind of 
intelligence will progressively transform legal practice, displacing many 
tasks lawyers perform today.  While we will look at many manifestations in 
law, all machine-driven legal services will use sophisticated algorithms 
both to structure data in various forms, such as legal documents, and to 
make predictions about future events, like case outcomes. 
Before looking at some of the current and forthcoming forms of machine 
intelligence in the legal profession, it is important to recognize two central 
propositions about the progress of machine intelligence.  First, before the 
combination of hardware, software, and connectivity progresses to a certain 
point, machine intelligence represents no substitute for human activity.  For 
example, decades after computers were invented, they presented no 
 
 17. Michael Chui et al., The Internet of Things, MCKINSEY Q., Mar. 2010, at 70, 74. 
 18. See John Markoff, Computer Wins on ‘Jeopardy!’:  Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 17, 2011, at A1. 
 19. Quentin Hardy, IBM Is Betting That Watson Can Earn Its Keep, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 
2014, at B9. 
 20. Margalit Gur-Arie, IBM’s Watson Starts Its Medical Career, KEVINMD.COM (Mar. 
30, 2013), http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2013/03/ibms-watson-starts-medical-career.html; 
see also Elementary Solution:  IBM’s Watson To Sequence Cancer DNA, KHALEEJ TIMES 
(Mar. 21, 2004), http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?section=diversions
&xfile=/data/diversions/2014/March/diversions_March11.xml. 
 21. Mariella Moon, IBM Watson’s Supercomputer Has a New Job, As a Lawyer, 
DIGITAL TRENDS (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/watson-usc-
competition/#!CqOoE. 
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challenge to an average chess player, let alone grand masters.  But once 
machine intelligence reaches a level where it becomes competitive with 
humans, it continues to improve, soon surpassing human skills.  Second, 
because increases in the power of computing are exponential rather than 
linear, computers may be able to undertake complicated legal tasks 
relatively sooner than it initially took computers to do simpler legal tasks.  
For instance, in 2004, not a single autonomous vehicle drove farther than 
eight miles on a course through the desert.22  But before the middle of the 
next decade, researchers predict that driverless cars will transport 
passengers in highway and urban driving.23  Similarly, in the past forty 
years, legal computer programs have perfected only keyword searches.  
However, because of technological acceleration, in less time computers will 
be able to pick and choose for themselves the best precedent to cite in a 
brief.  Even if computational capacity doubles only every two years, the 
next decade will witness more than thirty times as much increase in power 
as the previous one.  Thus, although machines are just beginning to perform 
legal tasks, we can expect substantial progress in the decade ahead and 
likely even more in the decades beyond. 
B.  Five Areas of Law on the Cusp of Machine Intelligence Invasion 
In this section, we briefly describe five areas that machine intelligence 
will dramatically change in the near future:  (1) discovery; (2) legal search; 
(3) document generation; (4) brief and memoranda generation; and 
(5) prediction of case outcomes.  Developments in predictive analytics, 
which we will discuss at greatest length in connection with case outcomes, 
will affect all five of these areas.  But we have decided to use familiar 
categories defined by legal tasks to describe the effects of machine 
intelligence rather than focus more abstractly on computer methods.  This 
approach also allows us to highlight specific innovations and startups that 
are early indications of the disruptions lawyers will face. 
New information technology has already transformed some tasks, like 
discovery.  Others, like brief writing, have not yet been fundamentally 
altered.  But there are already signs that such fields will be transformed, 
because information technology is already being developed in allied fields, 
like journalism, to perform skills similar to those of lawyers.  Because the 
exponential growth in computation is relatively regular, it is possible to 
estimate when various benchmarks may be reached.  This section does not 
provide a comprehensive depiction of developments in each of the five 
areas; that kind of thick description would require five different articles.  
But, sketching the arc of machine intelligence in disparate areas of legal 
 
 22. Marsha Walton, Robots Fail To Complete Grand Challenge:  $1 Million Prize Goes 
Unclaimed, CNN.COM (May 6, 2004, 10:44 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/ptech/
03/14/darpa.race/. 
 23. See Autonomous Vehicles:  Self-Driving Vehicles, Autonomous Parking, and Other 
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems:  Global Market Analysis and Forecasts, NAVIGANT 
RES., http://www.navigantresearch.com/research/autonomous-vehicles (last visited Apr. 26, 
2014). 
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practice underscores our overall conclusion:  machines are coming, and 
once they become part of the legal practice, their performance will 
exponentially improve. 
1.  Discovery 
Machine intelligence is most advanced in discovery, probably because 
legal discovery represents the application of general methods of machine 
search to the review of legal documents.  In its simpler, but still helpful, 
form, electronic discovery, or e-discovery, is the process by which 
computers search a database for keywords that lawyers agree are marks of 
relevance.24  But keyword search is a relatively blunt instrument.  Such 
searches may be both over- and underinclusive because keywords may be 
absent from some relevant documents and yet present in some irrelevant 
documents. 
Predictive coding has fundamentally transformed the prospects for e-
discovery.  In predictive coding, lawyers look at a sample of the larger set 
of documents.  Computer technicians help construct algorithms that predict 
whether a document is relevant.25  Of course, predictive coding is 
imperfect, because it can miss some documents.  But, imperfection is the 
norm even when lawyers perform document review, where fatigue, 
boredom, and other frailties—which do not affect machines—can 
substantially reduce the accuracy of document review.  As a result, some 
courts have approved predictive coding as a tool of discovery that 
essentially will make the final decisions of relevance, because they believe 
the price and performance of e-discovery is at least equal to that of the 
traditional kind.26  The U.S. Department of Justice’s antitrust division has 
sometimes approved predictive coding for the review of antitrust cases 
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.27  As 
with other information technology, e-discovery will be more commonplace 
as it becomes more accurate and less expensive.28 
E-discovery is already changing the discovery practices of large 
commercial litigation—which consumed much time of junior litigation 
 
 24. See Steven C. Bennett, E-Discovery by Keyword Search, PRAC. LITIGATOR, May 
2004, at 7, 9. 
 25. See Joseph H. Looby, E-Discovery—Taking Predictive Coding Out of the Black Box, 
FTI J. (Nov. 2012), http://ftijournal.com/article/taking-predictive-coding-out-of-the-black-
box-deleted. 
 26. See, e.g., Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 27. Geoffrey Vance & Alison Silverstein, McDermott and DOJ Embrace Predictive 
Coding; 5 Lessons Learned During Fast-Paced Merger Review, L. TECH. NEWS (July 9, 
2013), http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202609909310/McDermott-and-DOJ-
Embrace-Predictive-Coding?slreturn=20140305004807; see also Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 28. That is not to say that e-discovery will not raise important legal questions of its own, 
particularly at the beginning of its adoption, such as how it will affect the proportionality 
principle in discovery.  For an excellent discussion of such questions, see Charles Yablon & 
Nick Landsman-Roos, Predictive Coding:  Emerging Questions and Concerns, 64 S.C. L. 
REV. 633 (2013). 
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associates years ago.  Now, large law firms have set up e-discovery units 
within their firms.  But new service providers independent of law firms are 
also springing up.  Modus, for instance, is an example of a corporation that 
both digitizes records and helps with predictive algorithms.29  Thus, 
lawyers will face competition from companies outside the profession that 
want to offer discovery services to lawyers.  These companies are likely 
more innovative, specialized, and less attached to traditional ways of 
thinking about the issue. The timeline for law firms to adopt e-discovery is 
likely to be quite quick, with firms using some form of predictive coding in 
essentially all large-scale litigation within the next decade. 
2.  Legal Search 
Searching for the law by combing through precedents has been an 
important part of legal work for centuries.  Machine intelligence will not 
only perform more of this work than lawyers, but will also perform it more 
efficiently.  Just as computers have progressively replaced humans in 
complex calculations (people who made such calculations were in fact 
called computers a hundred years ago), so will machine intelligence replace 
the legal search function of lawyers.30 
Computerized legal research began in the mid-1960s when the Ohio State 
Bar Association tried to create an electronic system to sort through legal 
opinions.31  That system became the foundation for the Lexis legal search 
system, which was introduced to the public in 1974.32  Westlaw was offered 
soon after, but its utility was limited, because it did not allow researchers to 
search the full text of legal opinions.33  At the same time, the Lexis system 
was handicapped because it contained an incomplete database of case law.34  
These problems have largely been corrected, and both Westlaw and Lexis 
are now staples of legal research. 
Such research has already been an important element of legal practice, 
replacing less efficient research from casebooks.  And as hardware and 
software capacity relentlessly improves, research is poised to become more 
efficient in accurately finding the case law and evaluating it for 
persuasiveness.  Watson signals one improvement:  the change from the use 
of keywords to semantics.  Previously, computerized legal search depended 
on search for the right keywords.  For example, a keyword search for 
 
 29. See generally MODUS, http://www.discovermodus.com/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). 
 30. For a longer discussion of the history of legal search, see John O. McGinnis & 
Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Series No. 12-22, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2130085. 
 31. F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords:  How Automation Has 
Transformed the Law, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 563, 573 (2002). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. The LexisNexis Timeline, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/anniversary/30th_
timeline_fulltxt.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
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“bonds” did not necessarily bring up cases concerning debentures.  That 
limitation will disappear with the rise of semantic search. 
Semantic search will allow lawyers to input natural language queries to 
computers, and the computers will respond semantically to those queries 
with directly relevant information.  If one searches for assumption of risk, 
the search may bring up cases that did not use these words but nevertheless 
deployed the same concept.35  We are already beginning to see startups 
bring more structure to the data comprised in a case, focusing on the 
matters relevant to legal issues.36  This winnowing of data is a step toward 
semantic search, because it makes cases conceptually tractable.  Just as 
Watson has effectively used pattern recognition to make use of concepts 
rather than words, so will machine intelligence exploit deeper pattern 
recognition to provide a kind of semantic search.37  LexisNexis is already 
taking steps in this direction.  But other search engines are starting to 
compete in this space as well.38 
All cases are not created equally in their precedential value:  they are 
more or less persuasive depending on the court and judge who decides the 
case and the force that the precedent has acquired over time.  They may also 
have different weights depending on the kind of argument in which lawyers 
use them and on the court and judge to whom the lawyer presents them.  
Thus, even when lawyers find precedents by means of a computer, they rely 
on their judgment when deploying it. 
But machine intelligence will also make judgments about the strength of 
precedent.  Network analysis can now evaluate the strength of a precedent 
by considering how much other cases rely on it.39  A recent start-up allows 
searches of legal briefs, potentially connecting the briefs to the results of 
cases in particular courts.40  Such services will also help gauge the strength 
of legal precedent as it is tested in subsequent case law, both generally, and 
also in the context of particular courts and judges.  Machine intelligence 
will not only uncover precedent but will also guide lawyers’ judgments 
 
 35. See McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 30, at 32. 
 36. An example of such a startup is Judicata. JUDICATA, https://www.judicata.com/ (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2014).  It creates structured data from case law, thus allowing attorneys to 
screen cases for specific procedural or factual details that make them more or less powerful 
as precedents. See Lora Kolodny, Khosla Ventures, Peter Thiel Back Legal Research Startup 
Judicata, WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2013, 1:34 PM) http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/
2013/05/28/khosla-ventures-peter-thiel-back-legal-research-startup-judicata/. 
 37. For a discussion of progress in the semantics of legal search, see Johnathan Jenkins, 
What Can Information Technology Do for Law?, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH.  589, 597–604 
(2008). 
 38. For instance, Ravel Law already offers free legal search. See generally RAVEL, 
https://www.ravellaw.com/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 39. See James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law:  Measuring the Legal 
Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324, 335 (2007). 
 40. BriefMine provides a database of legal briefs and opinions.  The core idea is to use 
search algorithms to relate the legal briefs to the relevant opinion.  Through such 
connections, BriefMine hopes to help lawyers understand how the winning brief contributed 
to victory in the subsequent opinion. See generally BRIEFMINE, http://briefmine.com/about 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
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about the use of precedent, as most lawyers can neither comprehensively 
evaluate the strength of precedent or recall all possible precedents to mind. 
As powerful as a semantic search that gauges precedential power will be, 
this kind of search is only the first phase of the improvement of legal 
search.41  In this first phase, the search engine will identify the relevant 
cases and then evaluate their optimal use.  Still, in this phase, the lawyer 
will do all the issue spotting and use the search engine only to identify the 
relevant cases.  In the second phase, the search engine itself will identify the 
issues implicated within a given set of facts and then suggest the case law 
likely to be on point for the issues it identified.  This second phase will 
further reduce the role of the lawyer in legal research. 
The speed of this change will depend on general improvements in search 
technology because that market is so much larger than the market for legal 
search.  We expect that the first phase of perfecting semantic search, 
including the evaluation of the strengths and uses of precedent, will come in 
the next ten to fifteen years. 
3.  Documents As Forms 
Legal forms are hardly new.  Since the middle ages when lawyers used 
forms of action, templates helped reduce the cost of law.  But machine 
intelligence will revolutionize the use of legal forms.  Most obviously, 
machine intelligence will help tailor these forms to meet individual 
situations.  For instance, a client of LegalZoom can already submit 
information about his assets and his intentions for disposal of his estate to 
generate a draft of a will.42  Trust and estate planning is already ripe for this 
kind of mechanization because this area of law has relatively few kinds of 
forms and unique factual situations that arise for the large majority of 
people. 
But as computers and software become more powerful, computer-
generated forms will have an even wider scope in legal practice.  Already, 
new companies, like Kiiac, attempt to use machine intelligence to generate 
a wider variety of documents.43 
In the future, documents will also improve as they become more closely 
connected to results.  With the growing interconnectedness of data, 
machines can relate specific contracts to all court decisions about them, 
creating a dynamic of practical critique for continual improvement of legal 
forms. 
 
 41. See McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 30, at 33 (discussing the first and second phase 
of legal search). 
 42. Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone:  Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 
53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 918 n.159 (2012). 
 43. See generally KIIAC, http://www.kiiac.com/index.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).  
Kiiac is not the only company in this space.  LawDepot is a website that can create 
customized legal documents. See generally LAWDEPOT, http://www.lawdepot.com/ (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2014).  Hotdocs is a software platform that automates the process of 
producing transactional legal documents and forms. See generally HOTDOCS, 
http://www.hotdocs.com/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
2014] THE GREAT DISRUPTION 3051 
Of course, at first, lawyers will still be very involved in marking up the 
first drafts that machines create.  But even at this stage, the savings can be 
very large.  For instance, Fenwick & West, a firm whose principal office is 
in Silicon Valley, developed a program that automatically creates the 
documents for incorporating startups.44  Matt Kesner, their technology 
officer, said:  “‘It reduced the average time we were spending from about 
20 to 40 hours of billable time down to a handful of hours . . . .  In cases 
with even extensive documents, we can cut the time of document creation 
from days and weeks to hours.’”45 
In the future, machine processing will be able to automate a form, tailor it 
according to the specific facts and legal arguments, and track its effect in 
future litigation.  As hardware and software capacity improves, so too will 
the generated documents.  We predict that within ten to fifteen years, 
computer-based services will routinely generate the first draft of most 
transactional documents. 
4.  Documents As Briefs and Memos 
Machine intelligence will not stop with automating forms.  Legal forms 
are easier to automate than legal memos or briefs because they often depend 
on more formulaic inputs.  At first these documents will serve as very rough 
drafts and will require very substantial additions and rewriting.  
Nevertheless, computer-generated drafts can still be valuable and 
comparable to the efforts of associates—even research assistants without 
law degrees—who generate drafts that an experienced associate can then 
shape into a far more polished product.  And, as with other advances in 
machine intelligence, programs become more useful over time.  That 
progression is evident in other technology, such as word processing and 
speech-to-text programs. 
Analogous programs already encroach on traditional journalism.  Just 
this year, the Los Angeles Times used a computer to write a story of 
breaking news about an earthquake.46  Its so-called Quakebot connected to 
information from the U.S. Geological Survey and created a publishable 
story from the data.47  The technology startup Narrative Science has similar 
programs that can write simple stories about business and sports.48  While 
these programs are simple now, more powerful computers and more 
advanced algorithms will produce a more sophisticated program. 
 
 44. Farhad Manjoo, Will Robots Steal Your Job?:  Software Could Kill Lawyers.  Why 
That’s Good for Everyone Else, SLATE (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/
technology/robot_invasion/2011/09/will_robots_steal_your_job_5.html. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Catherine Taibi, It’s All Over:  Computers Are Now Writing Stories, and Doing a 
Good Job, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/18/
la-times-robot-journalism-earthquake_n_4985929.html. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Steve Lohr, In Case You Wondered, a Real Human Being Wrote This Column, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2011, at BU3. 
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Ultimately, these kinds of programs will be able to provide drafts of 
briefs and memos, as well as connect to legal research programs, which will 
provide data for the writing program.  As with legal search, we expect 
substantial progress in programs over the next fifteen years until they 
deliver very useful drafts.  In the decade or two after that, such programs 
may deliver more finished products, at least for low-value transactions. 
5.  Legal Analytics 
Predictive analytics is a new discipline that combines data with analysis 
to make predictions.  Computational power allows substantial data to be 
collected and organized.  Patterns can then be found among the data.49  
Machine learning can help analyze regularities within the patterns.  With 
the help of these models, known data can be used to predict what will 
happen in situations that have not yet occurred.50  The missing data may be 
unknown and indeed unknowable if the data consists of future events, like 
the outcome of a legal case.  Predictive analytics is all the rage across the 
corporate world.51 
Using big data to guide decisions is one of the most important trends of 
the last decade.52  It has intensified so much that universities now offer 
courses, and indeed degrees, in data analytics. 
Predictive analytics is now coming to law.53  Indeed, law, with its 
massive amounts of data from case law, briefs, and other documents, is 
conducive to machine data mining that is the foundation of this new 
predictive science.  Legal data include fact patterns, precedents, and case 
outcomes.  For instance, one form of legal analytics would use fact patterns 
and precedent to predict a case’s outcome, thereby better equipping lawyers 
to assess the likely result of litigation. 
Of course, lawyers make implicit judgments about litigation prospects 
when advising clients whether to bring a lawsuit, settle, or go to trial.  But 
their advice is based on their intuitions and limited to their direct or indirect 
experience of law.  The advantage of predictive analytics is that it provides 
a mechanism both to access a vast amount of information and 
systematically mine that information to understand the likely outcome of 
the case at hand. 
Legal analytics is not a distant prospect; already, academics and 
companies are putting it into action.  For example, political scientists 
 
 49. See ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS:  THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL 
CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE 15 (2013). 
 50. See id. 
 51. See Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR1 (suggesting 
that corporate America now needs a million and half new data-literate employees to work in 
the area). 
 52. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA:  A REVOLUTION 
THAT WILL TRANSFORM  HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 6–12 (2013). 
 53. The best full-scale analysis in the legal literature is Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative 
Legal Prediction—or—How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-
Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909 (2013). 
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created a model of U.S. Supreme Court decisionmaking, based on previous 
Court decisions, that more accurately predicted future outcomes than a set 
of Supreme Court experts.54  A new company, Lex Machina, has gathered 
historical data from thousands of instances of patent litigation55 and is 
already being used to predict outcomes in that field.56  Lex Machina 
provides consulting services itself and also sells data to those who want to 
do their own modeling.57 
Admittedly, patent law is a relatively self-contained area of law.  Further, 
Supreme Court decisions regarding patent law, while touching on many 
issues, revolve around the votes of only nine justices.  Thus, patent law and 
the relevant Supreme Court decisions are perhaps the relatively easy legal 
concentrations for analytics to model.  Patent law also involves more high-
value cases than many other areas of law and, thus, it is more lucrative to 
use predictive analytics in patent litigation than in other practice areas.  But 
given the exponential improvement in the price performance of computers, 
the same approach will be taken to other areas of law within a decade.  
Predictive analytics will be imperfect, providing likelihoods rather than 
certainties.  But predictive analytics can still displace some lawyers by 
making better predictions than they do. 
To be sure, legal analytics will still leave a role for lawyers.  A lawyer’s 
judgment may still add some value to the predictions derived from machine 
intelligence, even if the machine prediction alone is better than the lawyer’s 
prediction alone.  Over time, however, legal analytics will reduce the value 
of a lawyer’s assessment in at least some cases. 
The rise of legal analytics will also have an effect on the number of cases 
that go to trial and the amount of discovery.  Whenever the parties agree on 
the amount a case is worth, the case is likely to settle.58  The convergence 
does not need to be perfect for two reasons.  First, the expense of legal fees 
on both sides creates a larger window in which settlement is sensible, 
because both sides will be better off settling for an amount between their 
estimates of the case’s value to save legal fees.  Second, in many cases, at 
least one side is risk averse and would prefer the certainty of settlement to 
the risks of litigation.59  As legal analytics provide better estimates of a 
case’s value, parties will converge more rapidly toward an agreement that 
falls within the settlement window created by legal fees and risk aversion. 
 
 54. Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project:  Legal and 
Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1150 (2004). 
 55. See Tam Harbert, Lex Machina Arms Corporate Leaders and Patent Attorneys with 
Predictive Analytics, DATAINFORMED (June 6, 2012, 11:50 AM), http://data-informed.com/
lex-machina-arms-corporate-leaders-and-patent-attorneys-with-predictive-analytics/. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Robert A. Weninger, Amended Federal Rule of Evidence 408:  Trapping the 
Unwary, 26 REV. LITIG. 401, 412 n.25 (2007). 
 59. Dana A. Kerr, The Effect of Ownership Structure on Insurance Company Litigation 
Strategy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 273, 276 (2005). 
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6.  Future Trends 
The areas of legal practice on the cusp of change through legal search—
discovery, search, document generation of both forms and briefs, and 
predictions of case outcomes—comprise the bulk of tasks in many legal 
practices.  As a result, those who engage in the routine elements of such 
services will face increasing competition from machines. 
Moreover, as machine intelligence commoditizes many aspects of law, 
information technology will accelerate greater transparency that will, in 
turn, accelerate such lawyers’ loss of market power over legal services.  
Most obviously, the transparency will come in the form of consumers’ 
increased ability to compare the prices of legal services.  But new services 
will also arise to help consumers compare the quality of lawyers.  Startups 
are presently devising metrics that use available data to compare the 
performance of lawyers.60 
But even if average lawyers will be disadvantaged, some superstars may 
earn even greater returns.  First, with great metrics of comparison, 
discerning who the superstars are will be easier.61  Second, superstars can 
extend their research through technology:  they deliver their innovative 
solutions to problems faster and to a broader range of clients.62  Some of 
these innovations will be in traditional lawyering, such as creating new 
forms of familiar transactions and shaping surprising and novel arguments.  
Partners may also be able to substitute machines for associates, thereby 
gaining more leverage at lower cost.  Third, for a range of important 
transactions and litigation, even small improvements in outcomes make it 
worthwhile for clients to pay for noncommoditized legal services.  Even if 
the machine intelligence provides very good services, mixing in human 
intelligence may assure the best possible result.  Accordingly, we may see 
an even more bimodal distribution of legal salaries, perhaps with a smaller 
group of even more highly compensated lawyers. 
Machine intelligence may also help lawyers, through skill or better 
organization, increase delivery of very low-priced services.  Unmet legal 
needs exist across the nation, generally for low- and middle-income people 
who cannot afford the prices lawyers charge.  These legal needs include 
matters as varied as counseling on small-business matters and writing 
prenuptial agreements.  Lawyers can use machines to help generate relevant 
forms, thereby reducing the costs of providing services and making the 
services more broadly affordable. 
Machines may affect some other areas of law to a lesser extent, because 
machines cannot easily add as much value to certain tasks lawyers perform.  
 
 60. An example is Avvo. AVVO, http://www.avvo.com/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 61. We already see this phenomenon in judicial opinions.  Because opinions are readily 
accessible now, small differences in quality lead to large differences in citation rates. See 
William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence:  A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of 
Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 275 (1998). 
 62. See Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845, 857 
(1981). 
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For instance, machines will not argue in court and thus will not replace 
those who specialize in oral advocacy.  Nevertheless, machines will 
indirectly affect the practice of trial and appellate lawyers.  With more 
accurate predictions of case outcomes, fewer trials should occur because 
more parties will settle.  And even trial practice requires research, 
discovery, and production of documents—all tasks that machine 
intelligence will radically alter. 
Lawyers are more likely to excel if they are specialists in novel laws and 
regulations.63  Machines will generally be most effective at finding patterns 
in past data to predict the future.  But if the current time is radically 
disconnected from the past or involves small amounts of specialized 
information, machines will have less data to analyze.  Consider, for 
example, hypothetical banking legislation, equivalent in scope and novelty 
to the Dodd-Frank legislation of 2010,64 passed ten years hence.  As they 
lobby for and interpret new regulations in the early years of the new legal 
regime, lawyers working on that legislation will add a lot of value for their 
clients.  Given the world’s ongoing technological acceleration, lawyers who 
specialize in areas connected to that acceleration, like intellectual property, 
may also continue to prosper. 
Lawyers do more than undertake legal analysis.  They bond with their 
clients, thereby fostering relationships of trust, which allow the lawyer to 
facilitate clients to see their long-term legal self-interest, even when clients’ 
passions and confusions cloud that interest.65  Machines are unlikely to 
perform this bonding function and, thus, will be unlikely to substantially 
affect this important aspect of the lawyer-client relationship. 
The overall effect of the machine invasion thus will be quite mixed for 
lawyers, but particularly difficult for nonspecialized lawyers of average or 
worse than average ability.  For consumers at every level, the progress of 
machine intelligence is excellent news, offering lower prices and more 
transparency.  It is especially good for the underserved middle class and 
even the poor who are more likely to access legal services at prices they can 
afford. 
 
 63. Cf. Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Relational Infrastructure of Law Firm 
Culture and Regulation:  The Exaggerated Death of Big Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 109, 119 
(2013). 
 64. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 22, 31, and 42 
U.S.C.). 
 65. See Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied:  Individual Autonomy and 
Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers’ Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 1103, 1139–40 (1992) (“The bond between lawyer and client fuels, and is fueled by, 
the heart of client-centered counseling—the careful, even elaborate, process in which lawyer 
and client work together to identify the relevant considerations on which the decision should 
be based.  This process makes sense only if it is believed that people are prone to overlook 
or misjudge important issues bearing on their decisions, and that correcting such errors is an 
essential predicate to their making decisions that truly serve their own interests.” (citations 
omitted)). 
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7.  Answers to Common Objections 
One common objection is that lawyers have always adapted to 
technological change and, in doing so, even increased their incomes:  
typewriters replaced quill pens, word processors replaced typewriters, and 
carbon paper came and went.  Lawyers continued to prosper and grow in 
numbers.  What is the distinction for the legal profession between the 
technological changes of the past and those of the future? 
The key differences are two.  First, the technology is now beginning to 
substitute for core legal skills, unlike copying and transcription.  The 
physical acts of writing and copying were not core legal skills.  Indeed, 
lawyers generally depended on copyists or secretaries to complete these 
tasks.  But now machines are climbing the value-added ladder, encroaching 
on the domain of lawyers.  Second, the rate at which machines are 
improving, and thus substituting for lawyers, is faster than ever before. 
Another objection is that these changes will create litigation about their 
proper scope, thus creating more, not less, demand for legal services.  We 
address below the question of bar regulation.  But there will also be debate 
about how to integrate such changes into the legal order.  For instance, e-
discovery has prompted new questions and will continue to do so.  These 
are merely transition costs, since the issues about e-discovery will 
ultimately be relatively settled.  And the savings from e-discovery—the 
huge amount of lawyer time required for litigation document review—will 
expand as the practice expands and deepens with computational advances.  
The larger point is that technological change, including change in legal 
technology, does impose transition costs, but transition is short term and the 
savings gains will be cumulative and increasing in the long term. 
A third objection is that these machines can never replace lawyers’ 
judgment.  First of all, not all tasks that modern lawyers undertake require 
much judgment.  Drawing up simple wills, for instance, is fairly routine.  
Also, machines can make judgments.  Watson displayed his confidence 
levels in different possible answers at Jeopardy, and this technology will 
soon be employed in medical diagnostics.66  It is difficult to argue that such 
a program is not exercising some of the same judgment required for legal 
tasks.  We agree that many tasks will still require lawyers’ judgment, but 
judgment will be required in fewer areas.  Even in those areas, lawyers will 
exercise judgment with the aid of substantial machine intelligence. 
Finally, some have argued that the promise of big data, which is a 
foundation of predictive analysis, is overstated.67  For instance, it is said 
that big data can show only correlation but not causation.68  Thus, in one of 
our examples, it might be objected that even if we show that a judge cited 
 
 66. See Adrienne Jane Burke, How IBM’s Watson Will Advise Oncologists on Patient 
Care, TECHONOMY (Mar. 20, 2014, 2:05 PM), http://techonomy.com/2014/03/ibms-watson-
will-advise-oncologists/. 
 67. Gary Marcus & Ernest Davis, Eight (No, Nine!) Problems with Big Data, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2014, at A23. 
 68. Id. 
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certain kinds of cases, it would not show that these cases were what 
prompted his decision.  But this correlation might well prompt investigation 
that would tell us things that would help a lawyer persuade the judge.  And 
even if the judge’s decisionmaking remains a black box, it seems that a 
lawyer would be well advised to rely on the kind of cases that showed up in 
the judge’s decisions, other things being equal.  It is also said that data 
works less well on small samples.69  We agree, and this is one reason why 
we think the future is brighter for lawyers in fast-changing, specialized 
areas of law.  But in other better-settled areas of law, there is a very large 
amount of relevant data.  More generally, we agree that big data is currently 
an imperfect tool, but like many other sophisticated, imperfect tools, it can 
substitute for substantial amounts of human labor, and some of the labor 
will be that of lawyers. 
II.  REGULATORY BARRIERS WILL NOT PREVENT MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 
FROM UNDERMINING LAWYERS’ MONOPOLY 
Part II builds on the foundation described in Part I:  machine intelligence 
will play an increasing role in the legal services market to the extent that it 
provides quality, lower cost legal services, or inputs into lawyers’ services.  
Except for superstars, highly specialized practices in areas subject to rapid 
legal change, and in-court appearances, machine intelligence already 
provides lawyers with significant competition, and this competition is only 
likely to increase.  The legal profession has, for the most part, accepted 
machine intelligence as an input and has even modified its rules to 
accommodate this development.70  At the same time, the legal profession 
has continued to promote unauthorized practice of law statutes that, on their 
face, create barriers to machine intelligence providing legal services or 
input to nonlawyers offering legal services.71  Nonetheless, despite 
unauthorized practice laws, the legal services market has largely become de 
facto deregulated with regard to machine intelligence, as Benjamin Barton 
and other commentators have noted.72  But even increased unauthorized 
practice enforcement in the United States would likely fail to stem the 
delivery of legal services through machine intelligence given the way the 
internet permits legal services providers throughout the world to deliver to 
U.S. consumers.73 
A.  The Significant Market Power of Machine Intelligence 
Machine intelligence has already begun to significantly compete with 
lawyers and undermine their monopoly.  Today, sizeable financial 
industries use machine intelligence to deliver legal services, even though 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 71. See infra notes 106–15 and accompanying text. 
 72. See infra notes 116–26 and accompanying text. 
 73. See infra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
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the most economically significant developments have occurred in only three 
of the five areas we identify in Part I. 
The three areas that have proven most profitable are legal research, 
discovery, and document generation.  First, the oldest and most lucrative 
area is legal research.  As we noted in Part I, the application of machine 
intelligence to legal research began in the mid-1960s and for-profit 
businesses, such as Lexis and Westlaw, entered the field in the 1970s.74  
Bloomberg LLP joined the competition in 2010.75  As of that time, the legal 
search industry had “generate[d] $8 billion a year in revenue.”76  Second, 
the application of machine intelligence to discovery resulted in global 
market revenue of $3.6 billion in 2010 ($1.1 billion in software and $2.5 
billion in services), with growth to $9.9 billion anticipated by 2017 ($2.5 
billion in software and $7.4 billion in services).77 
Third, document generation, while less established, is growing 
dramatically.  LegalZoom, Rocket Lawyer, Nolo, and Law Depot, among 
others, offer online consumer and small-business services using machine 
intelligence.  Major financial players have entered the market with Permira 
and Kleiner Perkins owning an interest in LegalZoom78 and Rocket Lawyer 
raising funds from Google Ventures.79  In 2011, for example, Rocket 
Lawyer had “70,000 users a day and has doubled revenue for four years 
straight to more than $10 million.”80  LegalZoom appears to be the industry 
leader with 2 million customers in its first ten years through 2011, and half 
a million in 2011 alone.81  Its revenue has grown from “$103 million in 
2009, $120 million in 2010, $156 million in 2011, rising to almost $47 
million in the first three months of 2012,”82 an annual rate of $188 million.  
In 2011 alone, “more than 20 percent of new California limited liability 
companies were formed using [LegalZoom].”83  Another large market is 
contract management, an industry that uses software to “automate[] the 
creation, tracking and monitoring of contracts and agreements” for business 
 
 74. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
 75. See Russell Adams, Bloomberg Hangs Shingle:  Financial-Data Firm Enters Legal 
Research, Challenging Westlaw, LexisNexis, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2010, at B8. 
 76. Id. 
 77. The E-Discovery Market Is Growing Fast, EDISCOVERY BUS. (Feb. 8, 2013), 
http://ediscoverybusiness.com/the-e-discovery-market-is-growing-fast/. 
 78. Viola Caon, Permira Funds To Acquire $200m of LegalZoom Equity, INVESTMENT 
EUR. (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.investmenteurope.net/investment-europe/news/2321352/
permira-funds-to-acquire-usd200m-of-legalzoom-equity. 
 79. Daniel Fisher, Google Jumps into Online-Law Business with Rocket Lawyer, FORBES 
(Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/08/11/google-jumps-into-
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 80. Id. 
 81. Benjamin H. Barton, A Glass Half Full Look at the Changes in the American Legal 
Market 17 (Univ. of Tenn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 210, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2054857. 
 82. Id. at 18. 
 83. Id. at 17 (quoting LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Amendment No. 3 
to Form S-1) (July 23, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1286139/000104746912007341/a2209713zs-1a.htm). 
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clients, including multinational corporations.84  A $400 million industry as 
of 2013, experts anticipated annual growth of 10 to 20 percent.85 
Accordingly, in these three areas alone, machine intelligence has made 
significant progress in undermining lawyers’ monopoly.  Machine 
intelligence already accounts for billions of dollars of legal services, and we 
can expect continued, exponential increases in the ability of machine 
intelligence to provide quality services at lower prices than human lawyers 
in these areas, as well as in the emerging areas of generating legal 
memoranda and predicting case outcomes.86  The only potential 
impediments to the rapid growth of machine intelligence in lawyering are 
legal barriers. 
B.  Why Legal Barriers Will Not Obstruct the Increasing Use of Machine 
Intelligence To Provide Legal Services 
Some commentators, including Larry Ribstein,87 William Henderson,88 
Ray Campbell,89 and Gillian Hadfield,90 have suggested that legal obstacles 
will hinder the application of machine intelligence to legal services.  While 
we agree with commentators’ skepticism of the unauthorized practice 
statutes and concede that those statutes pose some limited risk to the 
expansion of machine intelligence, we believe they will ultimately fail to 
stop the progress of machine intelligence in legal services.  First, the ethics 
rules do not prohibit lawyers from employing machine intelligence to 
perform work previously or potentially done by lawyers.  Second, even 
though unauthorized practice laws formally prohibit businesses that include 
nonlawyer investors or managers from providing legal services,91 the 
unauthorized practice laws have not been applied successfully to police 
machine intelligence products.92 
1.  Input into Lawyers’ Work 
The legal profession has accepted, and even embraced, machine 
intelligence as an input.  To facilitate this development, the American Bar 
Association (ABA) clarified its rules to permit and, in some instances, 
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 87. Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 807–08. 
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 90. Gillian Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation:  The Growing Economic Cost of 
Professional Control Over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1720–21, 
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 91. See infra notes 106–11 and accompanying text. 
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require the use of machine intelligence.93  In doing so, the ABA has 
categorized machine intelligence as either an inanimate tool, much like a 
computer, or as a nonlawyer assistant.  To the extent that machine 
intelligence is an input, lawyers must use it if necessary to provide 
competent services and should use it if it will help offer excellent services.  
An inanimate tool poses no threat under the rules, and nonlawyer assistance 
is acceptable so long as lawyers do not share fees with the nonlawyers and 
are unable to interfere with lawyers’ professional judgment.94  In 
purchasing and deploying machine intelligence as an input, even from an 
outside consultant, lawyers do not share fees and do not surrender their 
control of the delivery of legal services. 
The ABA has emphasized the importance of machine intelligence to the 
competence of lawyers.  Despite the fears of some that lawyers generally 
“lack . . . technological competence,”95 the ABA embraced machine 
intelligence inputs in new language added in 2012 to Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.1 as Comment 8.  This comment posits that “[t]o 
maintain the requisite knowledge and skill [necessary to provide competent 
representation], a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its 
practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant 
technology.”96  Mastery of technology relevant to providing legal services, 
including machine intelligence, has therefore become an express duty of a 
competent lawyer, as well as an essential obligation of the exemplary 
lawyer. 
At the same time, the ABA resolved issues regarding whether lawyers 
could lawfully employ nonlawyer-owned firms that provide machine 
intelligence services and whether such a machine intelligence input was 
consistent with the general approach that lawyers could employ or retain 
nonlawyers, so long as the lawyers controlled and supervised their input.97  
Some commentators objected that the use of machine intelligence services 
was in a different category than supervising paralegals in that “lawyers lack 
the requisite knowledge to supervise such a vendor.”98  Dana Remus, for 
example, has argued that lawyers generally do not possess “the proper 
analytical tools to assess whether a particular technology is adequate for the 
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task, or whether it is working properly when employed, raising questions 
about the scope of lawyer supervision.”99 
Rejecting such concerns, the ABA in 2012 amended the Model Rules in 
ways that facilitate lawyers’ use of machine intelligence.100  New language 
in the comment to Rule 5.3, which governs lawyers’ “Responsibilities 
Regarding Nonlawyer Assistance,” specifically acknowledges that “lawyers 
may use nonlawyers outside the firm to assist the lawyer in rendering legal 
services to the client.”101  The comment expressly states that nonlawyer 
assistance can include firms that rely on machine intelligence, such as e-
discovery consultants, and offers as specific “[e]xamples . . . hiring a 
document management company to create and maintain a database for 
complex litigation, . . . and using an Internet-based service to store client 
information.”102  Lawyers can ethically use these services so long as the 
lawyer “make[s] reasonable efforts to ensure that the services are provided 
in a manner that is compatible with the lawyer’s professional 
obligations.”103 Moreover, in language that encourages lawyers to use 
outside providers of machine intelligence services even when the client 
chooses the services provider, the comment states that the lawyer can share 
responsibility for monitoring the outside firm.  By permitting lawyers to 
“share responsibility,” this comment gives lawyers more leeway than the 
general rule that a lawyer is fully responsible for supervising nonlawyer 
assistants and vendors.104  The comment specifically states that “[w]here 
the client directs the selection of a particular nonlawyer service provider 
outside the firm, the lawyer ordinarily should agree with the client 
concerning the allocation of responsibility for monitoring as between the 
client and the lawyer.”105 
2.  Input into Nonlawyer Delivery of Legal Services 
When nonlawyers who are not working for lawyers provide legal 
services using machine intelligence, they infringe state laws that prohibit 
the unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers.  Under these laws, 
nonlawyers may only act as scriveners in filling out forms or publish legal 
forms with blanks for consumers to complete or books that provide general 
guidance to the public.106  As a general matter, unauthorized practice laws 
prohibit nonlawyers from providing personalized legal assistance.107  
Nonlawyers violate the letter of unauthorized practice laws when they sell 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Jackson, supra note 96, at 395. 
 101. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 cmt. 3. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. R. 5.3.  As one critic has noted, “Through these new provisions, the ABA 
abdicates a portion of the profession’s supervisory responsibilities over discovery practice to 
clients and other professionals.” Remus, supra note 95 (manuscript at 21). 
 105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 cmt. 4. 
 106. See Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law:  An 
Overview of Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2581 (1999). 
 107. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1978). 
3062 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
software or other machine intelligence that provides personalized legal 
assistance.  This is true regardless of whether the program provides 
individually tailored answers to legal questions or personalized documents, 
such as wills, contracts, or articles of incorporation.108  Typically, in such 
programs, the machine intelligence engages in a dialogue with the 
consumer where the machine asks a series of questions and, depending 
upon the consumer response, asks further questions or generates legal 
language.109  At the end of the process, the machine intelligence generates a 
legal document tailored to the specific consumer.110  When nonlawyers, or 
businesses with nonlawyer owners or investors, employ machine 
intelligence in this way, they have engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law.111 
For example, in the leading case of Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Committee v. Parsons Technology, Inc.,112 the Texas Unauthorized Practice 
of Law Committee sued to enjoin Parsons Technology from selling 
Quicken Family Lawyer (QFL), a software program that helped consumers 
create a variety of legal documents, including wills, trusts, and residential 
landlord-tenant leases.113  The court explained: 
When the user accesses a document, QFL asks a series of questions 
relevant to filling in the legal form.  With certain questions, a separate text 
box explaining the relevant legal considerations the user may want to take 
into account in filling out the form also appears on the screen.  As the user 
proceeds through the questions relevant to the specific form, QFL either 
fills in the appropriate blanks or adds or deletes entire clauses from the 
form.  For example, in the “Real Estate Lease—Residential” form, 
depending on how the user answers the question regarding subleasing the 
apartment, a clause permitting subleasing with the consent of the landlord 
is either included or excluded from the form.114 
Applying the rule that individually tailored services constituted 
unauthorized practice of law, the court found that QFL violated the Texas 
prohibition on unauthorized practice of law and granted an injunction to the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee.115 
Although these laws technically create an obstacle to machine 
intelligence providing legal services, in practice, the market for these 
services has become de facto deregulated.116  Even William Henderson, 
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who worries that unauthorized practice of law inhibits innovation, has 
observed that “[i]n ten years, much of the deregulation agenda will come to 
pass without any formal deregulation.  U.S. consumers and businesses are 
already voting with their feet.”117  Apparently, while the public has not yet 
challenged lawyers’ monopoly on providing human legal services, it feels 
entitled to have the freedom to purchase legal services provided by software 
and other forms of machine intelligence.  Indeed, within a short period of 
time after the district court decision in Parsons Technology, the Texas 
legislature expressly permitted the sale of computer software, such as QFL, 
as well as “‘similar products’” that provided individualized legal 
services.118  Similar lawsuits in Missouri119 and Washington against 
LegalZoom have created only “bumps in the road”120 that have resulted in 
“little change in [the] business.”121  As Benjamin Barton has noted, 
LegalZoom “has simply ignored the threat of [the unauthorized practice of 
law], getting bigger and more prevalent all the time.  This is actually its 
most powerful tool.  The larger, older, and more common LegalZoom gets, 
the less likely a court will find [unauthorized practice of law] and the more 
likely that a legislature might attempt to overrule an adverse decision.”122  
Indeed, the only significant opposition to nonlawyer providers of legal 
services has been to human assistance combined with machine intelligence, 
and not to machine intelligence alone.123  The combined human and 
computer assistance is the only area where LegalZoom has been forced to 
significantly alter its business plan. 
Moreover, even in the unlikely event that state regulators were to seek 
successfully to outlaw U.S. businesses from providing machine intelligence 
delivery of legal services, they would not be able to prevent the delivery of 
such services in the United States.  As Laurel Terry has noted, the legal 
services world is now flat.124  On the internet, providers based in other 
countries could readily provide U.S. residents with machine intelligence 
services providing legal assistance or advice under relevant U.S. law.  
These providers could be based in the United Kingdom, which now permits 
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nonlawyer providers of legal services,125 or in other legally sophisticated 
countries, such as China or India.   
Accordingly, those commentators, such as Hadfield, Henderson, and 
Ribstein, who argue that the unauthorized practice laws will seriously 
inhibit innovation in machine intelligence delivery of legal services, are not 
correct.126  Although unauthorized practice of law statutes undoubtedly 
inhibit innovation to some degree, they present only a manageable 
obstruction.  The de facto legalization of machine intelligence when offered 
without human assistance will only provide a greater incentive to 
developing more sophisticated and profitable machine intelligence services. 
III.  WHY OPPOSITION TO MACHINE INTELLIGENCE DELIVERY  
OF LEGAL SERVICES PERSISTS 
As we explained in Part I, the exponential development of machine 
intelligence in legal services is inevitable, and the application of machine 
intelligence to legal services will result in better quality legal services at a 
lower cost.  In Part II, we explained how regulatory barriers will not prevent 
this advance.  Given that machine intelligence is inevitable and will only 
improve the delivery of legal services and increase access to justice, why 
does opposition to machine intelligence in legal services persist?  We 
suggest that this opposition derives from two sources:  first, fear of machine 
intelligence and second, fear of the implications for lawyers’ monopoly. 
The fear of machine intelligence takes two forms.  One commentator 
argues that machine intelligence will never be able to provide legal services 
competently.127  We know from the success of machine intelligence in other 
fields that this fear is demonstrably false.  Over time, machine intelligence 
will inevitably outperform human lawyers in completing most legal 
services.128  Another commentator worries that lawyers will not be 
competent to evaluate machine intelligence.129  But as in other areas of 
technological advance, human legal experts will continue to assess the 
outputs of machine intelligence, even if as individuals they are unable to 
understand fully how that machine intelligence works.  Moreover, until the 
advent of true artificial intelligence, some human experts will retain the 
ability to program and assess the programming of machine intelligence in 
delivering legal services. 
Absent justification, the fear of machine intelligence in lawyering 
appears more likely connected to the commitment to preserving lawyers’ 
monopoly.  Machine intelligence not only threatens lawyers’ monopoly in 
practice, it also challenges the two elements that are necessary to justify 
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lawyers’ monopoly.130  The first element is the belief that legal expertise is 
inaccessible to nonlawyers.  The second element is the belief that lawyers, 
in contrast to business people, work to serve the public good.  Accordingly, 
even though the public does not have expertise necessary to regulate legal 
services, it can trust lawyers to regulate themselves in the public interest 
and need not fear that lawyers’ monopoly will result in rent seeking.131 
But if machine intelligence can provide services as expert as those 
lawyers could offer, or could provide nonlawyers with access to legal 
expertise, then the first ground for protecting lawyers’ monopoly—
inaccessible expertise—fails.  The other primary justification for 
professional privilege is lawyers’ commitment to, and protection of, the 
public good.  The delivery of legal services by machine intelligence 
suggests that legal services are a commodity.  The commodification of legal 
services highlights the reality that legal services, and therefore access to 
justice, are bought and sold.  As with other commodities, more money can 
buy better quality.  And better quality legal services translates into better 
outcomes, suggesting that justice is not equal under the law and that 
lawyers’ monopoly does not function to promote the public good.132  As a 
result, the fear that machine intelligence will undermine the ideological 
foundations of lawyers’ monopoly is a very real one. 
CONCLUSION 
The market for electronic legal services is at a relatively early, yet 
significant, stage in terms of the disruptive effect of machine intelligence in 
undermining lawyers’ monopoly.  As machine intelligence in lawyering 
develops exponentially, it will take an increasingly larger role in five areas 
of legal practice:  discovery, legal search, generation of documents, creation 
of briefs and memoranda, and predictive analytics.  Eventually, machine 
intelligence will prove faster and more efficient than many lawyers in 
providing those services.  Lawyers will continue to provide services that 
cannot be commoditized if they are superstars, practice in highly 
specialized areas of law subject to rapid change, appear in court, or provide 
services where human relationships are central to their quality.  Otherwise, 
no effective barriers to the advance of machine lawyering in legal practices 
exist—not even in the law and ethics of lawyering.  Lawyers will continue 
to embrace machine intelligence as an input and fail to prevent nonlawyers 
from using it to deliver legal services.  Ultimately, therefore, the disruptive 
effect of machine intelligence will trigger the end of lawyers’ monopoly 
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and provide a benefit to society and clients as legal services become more 
transparent and affordable to consumers, and access to justice thereby 
becomes more widely available. 
 
